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United States agriculture is in a global context. On the order of half 
the farm land in the United States is used to produce for export. Without 
overseas markets, the amount of adjustment American agriculture would 
require to bring domestic supply and demand into balance is almost im 
possible to conceive. That adjustment would involve the movement out 
of agriculture of about half of the resources of American agricultural 
production. If comparative advantage was at work without overseas 
markets, the bulk of farmers would leave agriculture and well over half 
of all the land which is now in agriculture would convert to other uses. 
American farmers must think in a global context, must recognize that 
their future depends on export markets and must recognize where those 
export markets are. This hardly seemed a problem a decade ago, but 
it is very much a problem now.
Before I proceed, I would like to state a simple message and a broad 
thought. We should all be thankful for the bountiful harvests occur 
ring in much of the world. We should be concerned that if we are com 
placent about those harvests, they will diminish in the future. We should 
be apprehensive that the extreme complexity of the task of using these 
bountiful harvests to banish hunger and to bring prosperity to those who 
produce them will turn us away from the policies needed to sustain and 
use that abundance.
I am grateful to Leonardo Paulino and J.S. Sarma for stimulating interaction on these important 
issues, David Chesser for developing much of the data, and especially to Tom Harrington for 




Today there appears to be an abundance and even a glut of food. In 
sharp contrast, a little more than a decade ago the World Food Con 
ference was called to recommend immediate action to deal with scarci 
ty and even famine in Asia and Africa. Global cereal stocks in the 
mid-1980s have been more than twice as large as in the mid-1970s. 
Real world cereal prices in 1985 were 30 percent lower than in 1981, 
compared to an almost twofold increase from 1972 to 1974. Real fer 
tilizer prices have fallen to equal the lows of the late 1960s, after hav 
ing more than quadrupled in real terms from 1971 to 1974. A lack of 
natural feedstock is now much less worrying than inadequate invest 
ment in fertilizer production. The focus of food shortage has switched 
from Asia to Africa.
In the early 1970s, not only was food scarce, but so were the inputs 
for producing it. If a low-income country had a crop failure, it was 
difficult for them to command the foreign exchange to import necessary 
food, food aid was greately diminished, and it was difficult to purchase 
fertilizer on the open market even if the countries had the necessary 
financial resources. That was an extremely difficult time for all food 
deficit countries and particularly the low-income ones.
Finally, many developing countries were diverted from long-term 
development efforts by overwhelming debt problems and the need for 
major adjustments in foreign exchange rates and their national budgets.'
In comparing the 1980s with the 1970s, it is worth making note of 
the switch in emphasis of food problems from Asia to Africa. In Asia 
in the late 1960s famine was widespread and the scarcity of food was 
acute. People like the Paddock brothers, in Famine 1975, were writing 
in favor of triage. The Paddock brothers argued that the food situation 
was so hopeless in Asia that close to a billion people should be written 
off as having no hope for survival. Although that idea was foolish even 
then, it is well to note how bad the situation looked at that time. Africa, 
however, seemed to be a continent abundant with land and with ample 
supplies of food.
The Green Revolution in Asia accelerated the rate of growth of 
food production considerably in the late 1960s and the 1970s. That,
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combined with the generally more favorable food situation in the world 
and growing incomes in many Asian countries which allow them to 
increase food imports when in need has switched the world food prob 
lem away from Asia. In Africa, however, per capita food production 
has been declining rapidly for a decade or two. Per capita consumption 
has also fallen. That has occurred in the midst of a miserable economic 
performance in most African countries that has resulted in acute food 
scarcity even in the face of the present global abundance.
Underlying Trends
Food production and consumption data for many developing coun 
tries are notoriously poor. Thus in examining the data and drawing con 
clusions about past trends and certainly for extrapolations into the future, 
one must be cautious. For some commodities, such as cassava in Africa, 
different sources show trends going in opposite directions, not just dif 
ferences in magnitude. Thus we will be particularly careful with the 
root crop data, and we will be careful to deal only with large aggregates, 
which, one can hope, average out discrepancies in the data.
It is also worth adding that analysis of these trends is useful for get 
ting an indication of the forces affecting supply and demand. Given that 
these-forces tend to be stable and powerful, it gives us a basis for look 
ing into the future. Despite the statistical difficulties, the policy con 
clusions which follow from the analysis are significant. They, of course, 
may lead inexorably to policy actions unacceptable to important interest 
groups. Thus, even analysis of past trends becomes a controversial mat 
ter. The facts of the global food situation are as contentious as the 
extrapolations.
As we discuss these underlying trends, we will see that the dynamic 
global food supply/demand balance links the interests of developed and 
developing countries and has important implications for foreign 
assistance, agricultural research policy, and the domestic agricultural 
policy of the United States.
For the period 1961-80, developing countries' cereal production grew 
at an annual rate of 2.9 percent per year; consumption grew at the
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considerably faster rate of 3.2 percent per year (table I). 2 Hence, net 
annual cereal imports of the developing countries increased more than 
fourfold in 20 years from about 15 million tons to 64 million tons. 3 
These data exclude the People's Republic of China because the extreme 
variability of production caused by major political events associated with 
the "Great Leap Forward" and the "Cultural Revolution" grossly 
distorts trends that include these periods.
Table 1
Trend Annual Growth Rates of Cereal Consumption
and Production for Developing and Developed Countries
1961-80 and 1961-83
  , 1961-80 1961-83 
Country _________________________________
group Consumption Production Consumption Production
Developing 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.5
(excluding China) (3.2) (2.9) (3.3) (2.9)
Developed 2.5 3.1 2.2 2.8
SOURCE: FAO, "Production Yearbook Tape, 1984," and "Agricultural Supply Utilization Ac 
counts Tapes, 1984" (Rome 1985).
Cereal imports to developing countries grew slowly in the 1960s and 
then accelerated sharply after 1972, with that accelerated growth showing 
no sign of decline through 1984 (table 2). 4 Developing countries in 
creased their share of total world imports of cereals from a 1961-63 
average of 36 percent to a 1981-83 average of 43 percent an absolute 
increase of 315 percent (table 3). The developing countries represent 
the only cereal market capable of rapid growth.
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SOURCE: FAO, "Agncultural Supply Utilization Accounts Tape, 1984" (Rome 1985).
From 1961 to 1980, cereal production in the developed countries grew 
3.1 percent per year. Consumption grew at a much slower pace, 2.5 
percent per year, with the difference representing a rapidly growing 
exportable surplus. 5 Developed country imports and exports dropped 
sharply from 1981 to 1984, with a substantial recovery in 1985. 6
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The Future: Projections to 2000
Projections of past trends for food supply and demand, though an 
uncertain indicator of the future, have three features that recommend 
them: they smooth the effects of short-term influences such as weather; 
they illuminate the effects of cumulative forces; and they show poten 
tial changes in a country's position from net importer to net exporter 
and vice versa, arising from given supply and demand changes. Such 
projections are particularly revealing for food, for which underlying 
structural forces of supply and demand only change slowly.
A standard projection from 1980 to 2000 for developing countries, 
assuming that trends in output and income from the 1960s to 1980s con 
tinue, shows an increase in the shortfall (or imports) of staple food crops 
of 40 million tons. Actual net imports in 1984 were on the projected 
trend line. 7
Growth in the demand for livestock products is an important source 
of growth in the demand for basic food staples. While in developing 
countries waste and by-products initially sustain livestock production, 
accelerated growth of livestock output quickly surpasses the inelastic 
supply of such feed. Further increments to production are made large 
ly on concentrate feeds, particularly cereals. The projections cited above 
assume constant feeding rates in livestock production.
If, however, we project the trend growth of feed use during the base 
period and further assume market relationships for livestock products 
at constant relative prices, the production shortfall in developing coun 
tries increases by another 40 million tons. 8 It must be emphasized that 
this projection of feed use requires a return to the per capita income 
growth of the 1966-80 period. The debt and structural adjustment crises 
must be met and passed beyond.
Developing countries have been expanding livestock product imports 
rapidly. Since livestock production is generally labor intensive, it is 
logical for developing countries to displace projected imports with 
domestic production. Success in such an effort would, conservatively, 
add another 40 million tons to food crop imports.
These favorable circumstances in essence mean that developing coun 
tries would improve their development strategy and return to the growth
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rates of the 1960s and 1970s. If they did this, developing country im 
ports would grow at a rate similar to or higher than in the past two 
decades.
Three caveats must be noted about such projections. First, one must 
take these numbers in aggregated form and not look at individual coun 
tries. That is because so many of the unpredictable events in the world 
benefit some countries and not others. For example, in the 1970s growth 
in most of the oil-producing countries surged ahead, it is said, at the 
expense of many oil-importing developing countries; perhaps the reverse 
will happen in the 1990s. Countries differ in their natural resource 
bases:Argentina and Thailand have very different ratios of people to 
agricultural production resources from Taiwan or Bangladesh. On all 
these matters, grouping countries helps us see central tendencies at 
times we do want to see the forest and not the trees.
Second, and very important, when we look at food gaps and trade 
figures, we are looking at small residuals from large estimates of con 
sumption and production small differences in production and consump 
tion data give large differences in "trade." It is rash indeed to predict 
trade volumes and their effects on global prices.
Third, we are poorly placed to judge the effects of pure science 
breakthroughs in biology on agricultural production. Keep in mind that 
while such breakthroughs add to demand as well as supply in develop 
ing countries, they add only to supply in developed countries.
Theory
Before drawing conclusions, it is useful to briefly outline the theory 
that lies behind the trends and relationships just presented, a theory that 
gives credibility to such projections. I abstract grossly for brevity. 9
In developed countries, food demand is virtually satiated and hence 
does not increase with income. In contrast, food output grows con 
tinuously through research and various complementary institutions. 
Without export growth, the benefit of technological change can only 
be realized by undertaking the socially difficult task of rapidly withdraw 
ing resources (land and people) from agriculture.
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In sharp contrast, in developing countries, the rising incomes of low- 
income people, derived from employment growth, are converted by 
remarkably high demand elasticities into effective demand for food 60 
to 80 percent of incremental incomes are so spent. Thus in developing 
countries, increased food supplies and increased employment are two 
sides of the same coin; one cannot proceed long without the other.
Furthermore, accelerated growth of food production can set in mo 
tion powerful multiplier forces on the growth of income and, especial 
ly, employment in other sectors. That, coupled with growth arising 
autonomously in the other sectors, results in the picture of fast growth 
in basic food staples production accompanied by even faster growth 
in consumption.
These relationships make reasonable the remarkable finding that from 
the early 1960s to the late 1970s, the 29 developing countries with the 
fastest growth rates in basic food staple production increased their im 
ports of basic food staples by 360 percent in the same period. 10 This 
potential for developing countries to expand demand for food faster than 
even high rates of growth of food production needs to be understood 
and nurtured. It offers exciting prospects for the reduction of poverty 
and malnourishment.
Implications: Developed Countries
The credibility of projections for developed countries is reduced by 
the large year-to-year fluctuations in food production. However, a simple 
projection to the year 2000 of domestic use and production for the period 
1961-80 shows an exportable surplus from developed countries more 
than double the largest projection for developing country net imports. n 
These estimates assume no diminution of growth rates for livestock feed 
inthe Soviet Bloc from the high rates of 1961-80. Such estimates con 
firm the need for a large reduction in developed country agricultural 
production.
These estimates are extraordinarily fragile. If, for example, the pro 
duction growth rate in developed countries were to drop to equal rate 
of 1972-83 and consumption growth rates were maintained, then the
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developed countries would actually become net importers. 12 Unfortunate 
ly, while prediction of developed country exports is highly uncertain, 
it matters immensely to the choice of development strategy in develop 
ing countries.
Since the production trends in developed countries are very much 
subject to policy, it is well to keep in mind the following points.
First, developing countries as a group will prosper more if they do 
not face rapidly rising food prices driven by their own demand. Con 
versely, they will be harmed by intermittent dumping on international 
markets and the consequent unpredictable periods of sharply depress 
ed prices.
Second, demand is much more responsive to price in developing coun 
tries than in developed countries, while supply is more responsive in 
developed countries than developing countries. Thus, rising global food 
prices foster surpluses in developed countries and reduce demand in 
developing countries, primarily through effects on the poor.
Third, however, the pace at which export surpluses are generated 
in developed countries now appears to be rapid enough to depress in 
ternational prices severely, suggesting a need for stuctural adjustments 
in developed countries despite the rapidly growing Third World market.
Fourth, given the social costs in developed countries of drastically 
reduced food production and the potential to raise food demand in 
developing countries through food aid-based employment growth, it is 
logical to develop such programs on a much larger scale than at present.
Implications: Developing Country Exporters
There are now few developing country net exporters of cereals. Two 
countries, Argentina and Thailand, with their favorable land-to-person 
ratios, accounted for 68 percent of total developing country cereal ex 
ports in 1979-83 and will export considerably larger amounts by 2000. 13 
There are probably one or two other developing countries with similar 
land resources and export potential but with unfavorable policies that 
hold back their agricultural potentials. These few countries are severe 
ly injured by food dumping by high-income countries.
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It is important for American farmers to recognize that while their 
markets lie in developing countries, there are very few developing coun 
tries that have a potential to be major exporters. They have in the past 
supplied about a quarter of the increment to developing country com 
mercial food imports; three-quarters has been left for the developed 
countries, including the United States.
In sharp contrast to Thailand and Argentina, the bulk of the coun 
tries projected to export food in the future are poor countries with high- 
population pressure. That is a quite different story.
In projections to 2000, countries with per capita incomes less than 
$500, strikingly, provide 83 percent of developing country net exports 
of major staple foods other than those of Thailand and Argentina. In 
particular, four countries China, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan- 
account for 71 percent of projected developing country net exports, ex 
cluding Argentina and Thailand (table 4). 14
Table 4
Relative Shares of Projected Developing Country Net Production Surpluses 
by Level of Per Capita GNP (1980), 2000
Projected net surplus 
countries by level of - 






























SOURCE: Data set used in preparing IFPRI Research Report 52, Food Trends in the Third World: 
Past Trends and Projections to 2000. Projections based on FAO "Production" and "Agricultural 
Supply Utilization Accounts" tapes according to methodology described in Appendix 1 of Research 
Report.
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Exports of food clearly represent a failure in employment generation 
and poverty alleviation for countries with per capita incomes less than 
$500. Half or more of their populations are deficient in food intake. 
The countries in the low-income group projected to become exporters 
tend to be large and populous, to have a substantial percentage of their 
total GNP in nonagricultural sectors, but a large percentage of total labor 
force in agriculture the former typically twice the latter. 15 Their low 
per capita GNPs are, in general, increasing slowly. These characteristics 
suggest that they have capital-intensive investment policies causing low 
growth in employment, to the detriment of their low-income people. 
A change in investment strategy would foster faster and more equitable 
growth, accelerate the food production growth rate and change these 
countries from food exporters to food importers.
We now see an interesting question. Is the tendency of some low- 
income countries with large, hungry populations to export a result of 
bad policy or is it a passing structural problem? One could argue that 
since the problem is concentrated in the under $500 per capita income 
countries, and seems to resolve itself when income exceeds that level, 
that we should just wait. But there are difficulties in getting a country 
well enough organized so that the small and medium scale service and 
manufacturing sectors, which are so employment intensive, can expand 
rapidly. The argument would run that as the development process pro 
ceeds, the infrastructure is built, the trained personnel are developed, 
and the institutional structures necessary for rapid growth in employ 
ment are created. The lower-income countries simply have not yet finish 
ed these complex tasks, but they will.
Alternatively, one might argue that countries such as Indonesia, In 
dia, Pakistan and the People's Republic of China, the principal coun 
tries in this category projected to have large exports despite widespread 
hunger, have simply followed wrong development policies, that they 
have concentrated their capital on a few, large-scale, highly capital- 
intensive industries that create little employment. This leaves little capital 
to spread over most of their population, meaning that activities that are 
employment-intensive are starved for capital. In this argument, a change 
in the policies these countries have for prices, the allocation of capital,
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and public sector investment would bring about much more rapid growth 
in employment and the demand for food. Those countries would then 
cease to be exporters and would move on to the import market as do 
so many other developing countries with a similar economic situation. 
I will return to this issue later under the question of policy for foreign 
assistance and for American agriculture.
Implications: Developing Country Importers
It is notable that, virtually without exception, developing countries 
with per capita incomes greater than $500 are able to generate demand 
for food more rapidly than domestic production growth. Developing 
country importers with per capita incomes less than $500 also manage 
to increase employment and hence effective demand more rapidly than 
production. Of course the least developed countries with the lowest in 
comes simply have low growth rates in food production. They are able 
to use foreign assistance and food aid to keep consumption somewhat 
higher than would otherwise be possible.
The number one policy need for net food importing countries is an 
international environment in which food supplies are reliable. If they 
are to expand employment more rapidly than food production, they must 
believe, first, that the shortfalls generated by these divergent trends can 
be met without steadily rising prices. That means there must be a reliable 
international market. Second, and perhaps even more important, they 
need to be protected from radical fluctuations in domestic and interna 
tional supplies. For the latter, one needs a source of international finance 
such as a well-operating International Monetary Fund cereal facility. 
Whether enlarged stocks are needed as well is a moot point.
In order for employment growth to increase demand for food more 
rapidly than domestic supply, there must be wide participation in the 
development process. This, in turn, requires a rural infrastructure that 
brings most people into close contact with the improved markets and 
technology necessary for the modernization of agriculture. There is also 
a need for the development of employment linkages between agriculture
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and the rest of the economy so that growing agricultural incomes will 
produce expenditure patterns and responses to those patterns favorable 
to the growth of rural industry and employment. Agricultural growth 
through cost-decreasing technological change is the basic engine for 
such growth.
A Note on Foreign Assistance Policy
Foreign assistance policies that support a strategy of growth oriented 
toward increasing agricultural production and employment are favorable 
both to growth and to poverty alleviation in developing countries and 
to increased markets for food exporters. What are the broad policy 
outlines of such a strategy?
First and foremost is investment in agricultural research and its supprt 
services to start the engine of growth. Agriculture is a difficult sector 
to move because of the constraints on the land area. Thus the growth 
of agricultural production is subject to rapidly diminishing returns and 
hence increasing cost unless agricultural research is performed, as has 
been so dramatically successful in the United States, effectively so as 
to come up with new technologies that increase yields per acre. Those 
same technologies, which are essential in land-limited Asia, also raise 
labor productivity under the conditions in Africa where labor produc 
tivity is a more serious problem than land productivity.
Second is assistance to growth of infrastructure to ensure breadth of 
participation in growth. In a world of food surpluses, hungry people, 
and inadequate rural employment, investment in infrastructure offers 
immense potential for the effective use of food aid, particularly in the 
low-income countries. It is puzzling that hunger and lack of labor for 
building infrastructure, can coexist with huge food surpluses.
Third is increasing food security nationally and internationally. That 
is needed because a strategy relying on food and employment growth 
is terribly vulnerable to the effects of normal fluctuations in food 
production.
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Behind all these processes is a rapid expansion of trained people a 
high-employment strategy of growth is accompanied by extraordinari 
ly rapid growth in demand for educated people at all levels. Foreign 
assistance is most effective when helping meet that demand.
Agricultural Research Policy
.1 want to comment specifically on agricultural research policy for 
developing countries in the current global food context because of the 
central role of research to agricultural progress. The onset of the Green 
Revolution in Asia was very much a product of American foreign 
assistance, in part from the foundations, particularly the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the Ford Foundation, and in part from U.S. govern 
ment foreign assistance. Assistance to agricultural research develop 
ment in Asia, and now in Africa, continues to be an important element 
of foreign assistance.
At the same time that agricultural research forms such an important 
element of foreign assistance, we find farmers in the United States who 
are concerned at loss of export markets, wondering whether helping 
developing countries to do agricultural research that brings about in 
creased production is going to provide competition in the domestic 
markets of those countries and even from exports. As we can see from 
a few countries such as Argentina and Thailand, and looking into the 
future, even more from some of the poorer countries, that is a legitimate 
concern. I have tried to emphasize how foreign assistance may be con 
structive in helping demand to increase more rapidly than the supply 
of food in the low-income countries characterized by great poverty, shor 
tage of food, and malnutrition.
The new environment of apparent global abundance of food brings 
somewhat differing requirements for food production research.
First, there must be an even greater emphasis than in the past on reduc 
ing the costs of production and hence raising incomes. In Asia, cost 
reductions occur by raising yields per acre. In Africa, the problem is
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more complex. Labor productivity is the greatest limitation to produc 
tion in Africa. We can already substantiate that, in general, the ap 
propriate way to raise labor productivity in Africa is through yield- 
increasing technology.
In Asia, since the International Rice Research Institute's pioneering 
work, which generated the variety IR8, we have not seen a major in 
crease in rice yield potential or reduction in the cost of producing rise. 
In fact, the real cost of production has been slowly rising over the past 
decade. Recent efforts have been dedicated largely to maintaining 
the yields produced by IR8 and widening the benefits of such varieties 
by increasing their adaptability and improving their resistance to diseases 
and pests. In this context, one can truly talk about saturation of the rice 
area with these high-yielding varieties. How will the growth rates of 
the recent past be maintained into the next decade or so? That is a serious 
problem in Asia. Our impression of food abundance will disappear within 
a decade or two without another research breakthrough.
Second, with a more bountiful food supply in the world, we have 
the opportunity to take more meaningful steps towards sustainable growth 
in agriculture. On the one hand, we must increasingly shift higher- 
yielding, more productive farming systems into environments whose 
ecosystems can sustain such increased intensity. That should allow a 
gradual increase in the proportion of population in areas more able to 
sustain it, while reducing population pressures in areas that cannot sus 
tain arable agriculture. We must ask ourselves what the implications 
are of this to two related research questions: (1) Under what cir 
cumstances and by what mechanisms can we use the increased abun 
dance of food in the world to reduce population pressures more rapidly 
in areas that cannot support arable agriculture? (2) Should that then push 
our research resources more towards the perennial grasses and tree crops 
that can be sustained in such areas?
Third, when the abundance of food increases, we must maximize the 
linkages between agricultural growth and employment growth in 
nonagricultural sectors. That too requires research. Increasingly, lack 
of effective demand for food is proving to be a constraint for develop 
ing countries with per capita incomes less than $500, in spite of
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progress in agricultural production. We have done a good job of 
documenting the existence of linkages between agricultural growth and 
employment in other sectors, but we have not gone far in producing 
the policy prescriptions for maximizing the size of those linkages.
Fourth, where food is more abundant, we can turn more vigorously 
to increasing employment by developing smallholder livestock produc 
tion. Here we face elastic demand for the product and hence a substan 
tial increase in demand from a small decline in prices. There are, 
however, clear technical problems, not only in production but also 
in marketing. Because of the inelasticity of waste and by-product feed 
supplies, research must have a twofold emphasis on increasing the 
productivity of grasslands and improving our knowledge about the pro 
ductive use of concentrate feeds. Any enhancement of livestock pro 
duction will also help to solve the difficult problem of inferior grains, 
such as millets and sorghums, and even maize. They are well-suited 
to large areas and there are good possibilities for increasing their yields. 
Yet the demand for them is highly inelastic except as livestock feed.
Fifth, with an increasing abundance of food, we need to focus our 
attention more on the problems of the poorest countries and the poorest 
people within those countries. However, these two sets of problems 
call for different treatment.
There undoubtedly needs to be an emphasis on the better areas within 
the poorest countries in order to increase the returns to investment in 
agriculture and to generate the funds for tackling the much more dif 
ficult problems of the more backward areas.
We must differentiate clearly between short-term needs to mitigate 
the problems of the poorest people in the poorest regions, and longer- 
term adjustments that can be made as population densities in those areas 
are gradually reduced through more intensive and sustainable develop 
ment elsewhere.
Conclusion
Two things seem clear from the foregoing analysis, the first somewhat 
more than the second. The future of American agriculture lies with the
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development of developing countries. They must raise their incomes, 
not just generally but among the lower-income half of their population 
specifically, so that those people have the purchasing power to increase 
their expenditures on food and to improve their diets. Thus it is in the 
interest of American agriculture to see development move quickly in 
developing countries. Because those countries are largely agricultural, 
that can only happen by developing their agriculture. Because they have 
either a shortage of land or extremely low labor productivity, incomes 
in agriculture can only be increased through research-based technological 
advance. Thus we find the anomalous situation that it is good for 
American agriculture to vigorously support agricultural research in 
developing countries so that they can increase the productivity of their 
agriculture. That proves not to be an anomaly because, as incomes in 
those countries rise, people spend a high percentage of their increased 
income on food. That is in sharp contrast to the developed countries 
where rising incomes of even quite low-income people essentially do 
not increase demand for food.
The second conclusion is that, at their rate of growth of food pro 
duction over the last two decades, the developed countries will pro 
duce far more than is necessary to meet the import needs of developing 
countries. Thus there will undoubtedly have to be structural adjustment 
in the agricultures of the developed countries. This is not just the United 
States and Canada, but also Western Europe. That structural adjust 
ment need not necessarily come from reduced prices, but our experience 
is that without lower prices the fiscal cost to governments is far more 
than they are willing to bear for long, although one cannot help but 
note that the willingness to bear high fiscal costs to support agriculture 
seems to be quite great. In both Western Europe and the United States, 
we are shouldering subsidies to agriculture that are multiples of what 
was thought the largest possible a decade or so ago.
If we put the first point and the second point together, we have a caveat: 
that if we expect developing countries to emphasize both increasing their 
demand for food and increasing production of food in their countries, 
we are asking them to throw themselves open to the vagaries of weather 
to a much larger extent than with alternative strategies. If they are to 
do that, they will want to believe and will want to know that food security
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is assured to them. That can be done through the financing facilities 
of the International Monetary Fund so that poor people in poor coun 
tries can bid food away from livestock during periods of scarcity. It 
also means that the developed countries, while making adjustments to 
their agricultures, must be careful not to go too far and bring back the 
food scarcities of the 1970s.
Let us hope that the present abundance of food is not an illusion or 
a quickly passing aberration. Let us recognize abundance for the bless 
ing it is. Let us respond by raising incomes in developing countries with 
new, cost-effective food production technology; by using food surpluses 
to back labor-intensive investment in the infrastructure that so broadens 
participation in growth; by providing food security measures that reduce 
the risks governments face; by caring about poverty and acting to reduce 
it; and most important, by learning now how to bring the lower-income 
countries to the stage of development where effective demand for food 
outruns effective agricultural development policies.
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8. Paulino, Food in the Third World, Table 15, p. 62.
9. This argument is developed fully in John W. Mellor and B.F. Johnston, "The World Food 
Equation: Interrelations Among Development, Employment, and Food Consumption," Journal 
of Economic Literature, 22 (June 1984).
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income elasticities of demand but trend comsumption patterns. Feed was projected on a trend; 
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were projected by regional groupings, the net surplus was 136 million metric tons, reflecting a 
high rate of feed consumption in Eastern European countries.
12. See footnote 11.
13. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Production Yearbook Tape, 1984," 
and "Agricultural Supply Utilization Accounts Tape, 1984;; (Rome: FAO, 1985), and projec 
tions in Paulino, Research Report 52. Argentina is a net exporter of 17 million metric tons and 
Thailand of 6 million metric tons (1979-83 averages), and they are projected to have net surpluses 
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14. From data set on individual countries used in Paulina, Food in the Third World. Assumptions 
of projections are the same as described in footnote 7.
15. Data from World Bank, World Tables, Volumes 1 and 2 (1983).
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